# Trust boundaries

> The identities and transitions that prevent one component from becoming universal authority.

Source: https://accd.github.io/verchestra/docs/architecture/trust-boundaries/
Content digest: `sha256:9bd0199eca4c4fb0d5d1924188aced1a70e0818254094598a0053f9f97d20d7f`

Verchestra separates trust domains:

- the CLI accepts human intent;
- the workspace preserves shared project state;
- policy authorizes effects;
- drivers translate packages into provider sessions;
- probes access registered data sources with read-only identity;
- evidence records source-bound observations;
- an independent verifier challenges completion;
- a human accepts or rejects the result.

No component is trusted because it produced convincing prose. Every boundary validates identity, digest, capability, and transition state.

Local credentials can authorize a bounded effect, but they cannot rewrite the portable contract. Signed evidence can prove integrity, but it cannot replace human accountability.